Abstract. Loosely speaking, an interactive proof is said to be zeroknowledge if the view of every "efficient" verifier can be "efficiently" simulated. An outstanding open question regarding zero-knowledge is whether constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge proofs exists for nontrivial languages. We answer this question to the affirmative when modeling "efficient adversaries" as probabilistic quasi-polynomial time machines (instead of the traditional notion of probabilistic polynomial-time machines).
Introduction
Zero-knowledge interactive proofs [14] are paradoxical constructs that allow one player (called the Prover) to convince another player (called the Verifier) of the validity of a mathematical statement x ∈ L, while providing zero additional knowledge to the Verifier. This is formalized by requiring that the view of every "efficient" adversary verifier V * interacting with the honest prover P be simulated by an "efficient" machine S (a.k.a. the simulator). The idea behind this definition is that whatever V * might have learned from interacting with P , he could have actually learned by himself (by running the simulator S). As "efficient" adversaries normally are modelled as probabilistic polynomial-time machines (PPT ), the traditional definition of ZK models both the verifier and the simulator as PPT machines. In this paper, we investigate alternative models of efficient adversaries-in particular, as in [21] , we model adversaries as probabilistic quasi-polynomial time machines (PQT ).
Concurrency and ZK. The notion of concurrent ZK, first introduced and achieved, by Dwork, Naor and Sahai [8] considers the execution of zero-knowledge proofs in an asynchronous setting and concurrent setting. More precisely, we consider a single adversary mounting a coordinated attack by acting as a verifier in many concurrent executions. Concurrent zero-knowledge proofs are significantly harder to construct (and analyze).
Since the original protocols by Dwork, Naor and Sahai (which relied on so called "timing assumptions"), various other protocols have been obtained based on different set-up assumptions (e.g., [9] [6] [4] ). On the other hand, in the "plain" model without any set-up Canetti, Kilian, Petrank and Rosen [5] (building on earlier works by [17] [26] ) show that concurrent ZK proofs for non-trivial languages, with so called "black-box" simulators, require at least Ω( log n log log n ) number of communication rounds. Richardson and Kilian [25] constructed the first concurrent zero-knowledge argument in the standard model. Their protocol which uses a black-box simulator requires O(n ǫ ) number of rounds. Kilian and Petrank [16] later obtained a round complexity ofÕ(log 2 n), and finally Prabhakaran, Rosen and Sahai [23] essentially closed the gap by obtaining a round complexity ofÕ(log n).
All of the above results rely on the traditional modeling of adversaries as PPT machines. Thus, it is feasible that there exists some super-polynomial, but "well-behaved", model of adversaries that admits constant-round concurrent ZK proofs.
Concurrent ZK w.r.t super-polynomial adversaries. The lower bound of [17] shows that only languages decidable in probabilistic subexponential-time have 4-round concurrent black-box zero-knowledge arguments w.r.t to probabilistic subexponential-time adversaries. On the other hand, [21] constructs constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge arguments w.r.t PQT verifiers (and consequently also simulators); however the soundness condition of those argument systems only holds w.r.t. PPT adversaries-in fact, the simulator succeeds in its simulation by breaking the soundness condition of the argument system. Additionally, it is noted in [21] that there exist 3-round concurrent ZK proofs w.r.t. exponential-time adversaries (as any witness indistinguishable proof is also zero-knowledge with respect to exponential-time verifiers). Finally, [25] claimed that a constant-round version of their protocol remains secure w.r.t PQT adversaries, when considering a "benign" type of concurrent adversary (which never sends any invalid messages and has a fixed-i.e., non-adaptively chosen-scheduling), but as far as we know a proof of this has never appeared. Thus, the above results leave open the question of whether there exist r(n)-round concurrent black-box zero-knowledge proofs w.r.t super-polynomial, but sub-exponential, adversaries, as long as 4 < r(n) < log n. In particular, Does there exists constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge arguments w.r.t. PQT (or even sub-exponential time) adversaries?
Our results
Our main result answers the above question in the affirmative. Let PQT denote the class of probabilistic quasi-polynomial time machines, i.e., randomized machines that run in time n poly(log(n)) . Let ω(PQT ) denote the class of probabilistic super quasi-polynomial time machines, i.e. randomized machines that run in time n ω(poly(log(n))) .
Theorem 1 (Main Theorem). Assume the existence of claw-free permutations w.r.t PQT . Then, every language in N P has an O(1)-round perfect concurrent black-box ZK argument w.r.t PQT .
In addition, we show:
Theorem 2. Assume the existence of one-way functions that are secure w.r.t ω(PQT ) and collision-resistant hash function that are secure w.r.t PQT . Then, every language in N P has an O(1)-round concurrent computational black-box ZK proof w.r.t PQT .
Theorem 3. Assume the existence of one-way function that are secure w.r.t ω(PQT ). Then, every language in N P has an O(1)-round concurrent computational black-box ZK arguments w.r.t PQT .
Theorem 4.
There exists an O(1)-round concurrent perfect ZK proof w.r.t PQT for Graph Non-Isomorphism and Quadratic Non-Residuosity
We emphasize that in the above theorems, "ZK proofs and arguments w.r.t PQT " refer to proofs/ arguments where both the soundness condition and the ZK condition holds w.r.t to PQT adversaries; in particular, for the ZK property we also require that the distinguishability gap is smaller than the inverse of any quasi-polynomial function.
A note on expected running-time. In contrast to earlier work on concurrent zero-knowledge (e.g. [25, 16, 23] ), our simulators run in expected PQT . This is inherent: by the work of Barak-Lindell [1] it follows that only languages decidable in PQT have constant-round ZK protocols w.r.t PQT if requiring a strict PQT simulator (let alone the question of concurrency). In particular, this shows that none of the previous simulation techniques can be extended to get constant-round protocols w.r.t PQT (at least when requiring that the output of the simulation is also indistinguishable for PQT ).
1
Additional results. Finally, we mention that our techniques apply also to concurrent ZK proofs w.r.t PPT . As a result we obtain the first concurrent perfect ZK arguments/proofs w.r.t PPT .
Theorem 5. Assume the existence of claw-free permutations (w.r.t PPT ). Then, every language in N P has an O(n ǫ )-round perfect concurrent black-box ZK argument w.r.t PPT , for every ǫ > 0.
Theorem 6. For every ǫ > 0, there exists a O(n ǫ )-round concurrent perfect ZK proof for Graph Non-Isomorphism and Quadratic Non-Residuosity.
As an additional contribution, we believe that both our protocols and their analysis provides the simplest proof of the existence of concurrent ZK proofs (w.r.t PPT ).
2
PQT v.s. PPT: What is right model for adversarial computation? Recall that to show that ZK is closed under sequential composition, the original definition of ZK was extended to consider non-uniform PPT adversaries [13] -in other words, in the context of ZK the notion of non-uniform PPT (for modeling adversaries) is more robust than simply PPT . Additionally, security is guaranteed w.r.t a stronger class of adversaries. Of course, the extra price to pay is that all hardness assumptions now must hold also with respect to non-uniform PPT .
In this paper we show that by considering an even stronger class of adversariesnamely PQT -we get a notion that is even more robust; in particular, it is now possible to get constant-round concurrent ZK protocols. Again, this requires us to rely on hardness assumptions against PQT , but this seems like a weak strengthening of traditional hardness assumptions (especially since the known attacks on traditional conjectured hard functions require subexponential time).
A note on plausible deniability. The notion of ZK is traditionally associated with plausible deniability-i.e., that the interaction leaves "no trace" which the verifier can use later to convince that the interaction took place. Intuitively, this holds since the verifier could have executed the simulator (on its self) to generate its view of the interaction. We mention, however, that since the traditional definition of ZK allows the simulator to have an arbitrary (polynomial) overhead with respect to the verifier (who's view it is supposed to simulate), the deniability guarantee offered by traditional ZK proofs is weak: consider for instance a verifier with a running-time of t = 2 40 computational steps, and a simulator with running-time, say, t 3 ; although 2 40 is very feasible, 2 120 seems like a stretch! The example is not hypothetic-the "tightest" concurrent ZK protocols [16, 23] indeed have a running-time of t 2 not counting the time need to emulate the verifier. Additionally, as demonstrated in [18] , the traditional notion of ZK does not guarantee that the running-time of the simulator is (even polynomially) related to the running-time of the verifier in the view it is outputting, but rather the worst-case running-time of the verifier; this makes deniability even harder to argue. Nevertheless, in this respect, ZK w.r.t PQT provides even worse guarantees (as the overhead is now allowed to be quasi-polynomial).
Our techniques
The concurrent ZK protocols of Richardson and Kilian (RK) [25] , Kilian and Petrank (KP) [16] and Prabhakaran, Rosen and Sahai(PRS) [23] rely on the same principal idea: provide the simulator with multiple possibilities (called "slots") to rewind the verifier. If a rewinding is successful, the simulator obtains a trapdoor that allows it to complete the execution that has been rewound. The RK simulator is "adaptive" and dynamically decides when and where to rewind, while making sure there are not too many recursive rewinding (which would result in a large running-time). On a high-level this is done by recursively invoking the simulator, but ensuring that the number of levels of the recursion stays small (in fact, constant). On the other hand the KP (and PRS) simulator is "oblivious"; the simulator has a fixed rewinding scheduling, thereby ensuring a fixed (and bounded) running-time. The core of the argument is then to show that every execution has a slot that is rewound at least once.
Our approach is based on the approach taken by RK. As RK, we consider an adaptive simulator that makes recursive calls to itself, while ensuring that the depth of the recursion stays small. Our actual simulation procedure is, however, quite different. On a high-level, our approach will perform a straight-line simulation until a "good" slot has been found, and then continue rewinding that slot until a trapdoor has been found. Thus, in contrast to the previous approach, we can not bound the worst-case running-time of our simulator, instead we are forced to bound the expected running-time of the simulator.
The benefit of our approach is that 1) it enables us to achieve perfect simulation, and 2) our analysis works no matter how many slots we have and what the depth of recursion is. In fact, we can achieve both of these properties while still guaranteeing the same expected running-time as RK-namely O(m O(log r m) ), where r is the number of slots. As a consequence, when applied to constant-round protocols (and considering a logarithmic recursive depth) we get a quasi-polynomial running time. As already mentioned, for this application, it is inherent to have an expected quasi-polynomial running-time.
Open questions
We have demonstrated that constant-round concurrent ZK is possible w.r.t PQT adversaries. Our protocol currently uses 10 communication rounds 4 . A natural open question is to either improve the round-complexity or to strengthen the 4-round lower bound of [17] . Another question is to investigate the possibility of using an even weaker (but still super-polynomial) model of computation. Rosen [26] shows that only languages in probabilistic sub quasi-polynomial time have 7-round concurrent black-box zero-knowledge arguments when adversaries are modelled as probabilistic sub quasi-polynomial time machines; thus, such protocols would require more than 7-rounds.
Organization
Definitions are found in Section 2. The proof of main theorem is contained in Sections 3 and 4. We give proof sketches for the remaining theorems in Section 5.
Definitions and Notations
We assume familiarity with the basic notions of an Interactive Turing Machine (ITM for brevity) and a protocol (in essence a pair of ITMs. Briefly, a protocol is pair of ITMs computing in turns. A round ends with the active machine either halting -in which case the protocol halts -or by sending a message m to the other machine, which becomes active with m as a special input. We let C denote any class of functions.
Interactive Proofs and Arguments
Given a pair of interactive Turing machines, P and V , we denote by P, V (x) the random variable representing the (local) output of V when interacting with machine P on common input x, when the random input to each machine is uniformly and independently chosen.
Definition 1 (T (·)-sound
Interactive Proof System) A pair of interactive machines P, V is called T (·)-sound interactive proof system for a language L if machine V is polynomial-time and the following two conditions hold :
For every x ∈ L, and every interactive machine B,
In case that the soundness condition holds only with respect to a T (n)-bounded prover, the pair P, V is called an T (·)-sound interactive argument. P, V is an interactive proofs (interactive argument) w.r.t. C if for all T (·) ∈ C the protocol is a T (·)-sound interactive proof (T (·)-sound interactive argument).
Indistinguishability
We rely on a generalization of the notion of indistinguishability [27] , which considers T (n)-bounded distinguishers and require the indistinguishability gap to be smaller than 1 poly(T (n)) . [21] ) Let X and Y be countable sets. Two ensembles {A x,y } x∈X,y∈Y and {B x,y } x∈X,y∈Y are said to be indistinguishable in time T (·) over x ∈ X, if for every probabilistic "distinguishing" algorithm D with running time T (·) in its first input, and every x ∈ X, y ∈ Y it holds that:
Definition 2 (Strong T (·)-indistinguishability
Definition 3 (Computational indistinguishability w.r.t C) Let X and Y be countable sets. Two ensembles {A x,y } x∈X,y∈Y and {B x,y } x∈X,y∈Y are said to be indistinguishable w.r.t C over x ∈ X, if A, B are q(·)-indistinguishable for every function q(·) ∈ C.
Witness Indistinguishability
An interactive proof is said to be witness indistinguishable (WI) if the verifier's view is "computationally independent" of the witness used by the prover for proving the statement-i.e. the view of the Verifier in the interaction with a prover using witness w 1 or w 2 for two different witnesses are indistinguishable.
Definition 4 (Witness-indistinguishability w.r.t C) Let P, V be an interactive proof system for a language L ∈ N P. We say that P, V is C-witnessindistinguishable for R L , if for every probabilistic polynomial-time interactive machine V * and for every two sequences {w
We say that the proof system is perfectly witness indistinguishable (Perfect-WI) if the corresponding views are identically distributed.
Black-box concurrent zero-knowledge
Let P, V be an interactive proof for a language L. Consider a concurrent adversary verifier V * that, given an input instance x ∈ L interacts with m independent copies of P concurrently, without any restrictions over the scheduling of the messages in the different interactions with P . Let view 2 
x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1} * denote the random variable describing the view of the adversary V * on common input x and auxiliary input z, in an interaction with P .
Definition 5 (Black-box concurrent zero-knowledge w.r.t C:) Let P, V be an interactive proof system for a language L. We say that P, V is black-box concurrent zero-knowledge w.r.t C if for every functions q, m ∈ C, there exists a probabilistic algorithm S q,m , such that for every concurrent non-uniform adversary V * that on common input x and auxiliary input z has a running-time bounded by q(|x|) and opens up m(|x|) executions, S q,m (x, z) runs in time polynomial in |x|. Furthermore, the ensembles S q,m (x, z) x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1} * and
Other primitives
We informally define the other primitives we use in the construction of our protocols.
Special-sound proofs: A 3-round public-coin interactive proof for the language L ∈ N P with witness relation R L is special-sound with respect to R L , if for any two transcripts (α, β, γ) and (α ′ , β ′ , γ ′ ) such that the initial messages α, α ′ are the same but the challenges β, β ′ are different, there is a deterministic procedure to extract the witness from the two transcripts that runs in polynomial time. Special-sound WI proofs for languages in N P can be based on the existence of non-interactive commitment schemes, which in turn can be based on one-way permutations. Assuming only one-way functions, 4-round special-sound WI proofs for NP exists 5 . For simplicity, we use 3-round special-sound proofs in our protocol though our proof works also with 4-round proofs. Proofs of knowledge: Informally an interactive proof is a proof of knowledge if the prover convinces the verifier not only of the validity of a statement, but also that it possesses a witness for the statement. If we consider computationally bounded provers, we only get a "computationally convincing" notion of a proof of knowledge (a.k.a arguments of knowledge)
3 Our Protocol and Simulator
Description of the protocol
Our concurrent ZK protocol (also used in [24] ) is a slight variant of the precise ZK protocol of [20] , which in turn is a modification of the Feige-Shamir protocol [10] . The protocol proceeds in the following two stages, on a common input statement x ∈ {0, 1} * and security parameter n,
1. In Stage 1, the Verifier picks two random strings s 1 , s 2 ∈ {0, 1} n , and sends their image c 1 = f (r 1 ), c 2 = f (r 2 ) through a one-way function f to the Prover. The Verifier sends α 1 , . . . , α r , the first messages of r invocations of a WI special-sound proof of the fact that c 1 and c 2 have been constructed properly (i.e., that they are in the image set of f ). This is followed by r iterations so that in the j th iteration, the Prover sends β j ← {0, 1} n 2 , a random second message for the j th proof and the Verifier sends the third message γ j for the j th proof. 2. In Stage 2, the Prover provides a WI proof of knowledge of the fact that either x is in the language, or (at least) one of c 1 and c 2 are in the image set of f .
More precisely, let f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a one-way function and let the witness relation R L ′ , where ((
Let the language L ∈ N P. Protocol ConcZKArg for proving that x ∈ L is depicted in Figure 1 .
The soundness and the completeness of the protocol follows directly from the proof of Feige and Shamir [10] ; in fact, the protocol is an instantiation of theirs.
5 A 4-round protocol is special sound if a witness can be extracted from any two transcripts (τ, α, β, γ) and (τ
(Intuitively, to cheat in the protocol a prover must "know" an inverse to either c 1 or c 2 , which requires inverting the one-way function f .).
Protocol ConcZKArg
Common Input: an instance x of a language L with witness relation RL. Auxiliary Input for Prover: a witness w, such that (x, w) ∈ RL(x).
P ↔ V: a perfect-WI argument of knowledge of the statement either there exists values r
The argument of knowledge is with respect to the witness relation 
Description of the simulator
On a very high-level the simulation follows that of Feige and Shamir [10] : the simulator will attempt to rewind one of the special-sound proofs-each such proof, i.e. the challenge(β) and the response(γ) is called a slot. If the simulator gets two accepting proof transcripts, the special-soundness property allows the simulator to extract a "fake" witness r i such that c i = f (r i ). This witness can later be used in the second phase of the protocol. We call an execution "solved" if a witness is extracted. More precisely, our simulation is defined recursively in the following manner.
On the recursive level ℓ, the simulator feeds random Stage 1 messages to V * (Step 3). Whenever a slot s closes, S decides whether or not to rewind s depending on the number of new executions that started between the opening and the closing of s. If the number of executions is "small" (where small is defined based on the level ℓ), S begins rewinding the slot, i.e. S sends a new challenge β for slot s and recursively invokes itself on recursive level ℓ + 1, and continues executing until one of the following happens:
1. S is "stuck" at Stage 2 of an unsolved execution that started at level ℓ + 1:
S halts and outputs fail. 2. The closing message γ for slot s occurs: S extracts a "fake" witness using the special-sound property and continues its simulation (on level ℓ). 3. V * aborts or starts "too many" executions: S restarts its rewinding using a new challenge β for s. We show that S in expectation restarts O(1) times because of this. (Intuitively this follows since during the execution at level ℓ, S only starts rewinding if V * did not abort and only opened a "small" number of executions). 4. S gets "stuck" at Stage 2 of an unsolved execution that started at level ℓ:
Again, S restarts its rewinding. We show that this case can happen at most m − 1 times, where m is the total number of executions. 5. S gets "stuck" at Stage 2 of an unsolved execution that started at level ℓ ′ < ℓ: S returns the view to level ℓ ′ .
In the unlikely event that S asks the same challenge β twice, S performs a brute-force search for the witness. Furthermore, to simplify the analysis of the running-time, the simulation is cut-off if it runs "too long" and S extracts witnesses for each execution using brute-force search.
The basic idea behind the simulation is similar to [25] : if we define "small" appropriately we can ensure that some slot of every execution is rewound and the expected running time is bounded. A first approach would be to ensure that at recursive level l at most m r ℓ executions start, and define "small" to be m r ℓ+1 , where m is the number of executions and r is the number of slots. Then, for every execution that started at level ℓ and completed r slots, S is guaranteed to rewind at least one slot. Furthermore, if we show that the expected number of rewindings of each slot is O(m), then the expected running time of the simulator is at most poly(m log r m ); letting r = 2, the running time becomes poly(m log 2 m ). However, to make sure that the simulator does not output fail, our analysis requires the simulator to be able to rewind at least two slots-in fact, we require that once the simulator reaches the last slot, it has already performed one rewinding. To ensure this, we make sure that at level ℓ, there are at most m (r−1) ℓ executions and define "small" to be m (r−1) ℓ+1 ; now letting r = 3 we get a running-time of poly(m log r m ). A formal description of our simulator can be found in Figure 4 .2. We rely on the following notation.
-d = ⌈log r−1 m⌉ will denote the maximum depth of recursion.
-slot (i, j) will denote slot j of execution i. -A partial view h is defined to be good w.r.t (s, l), if in h, V * does not abort on s and does not open more that (r −1) d−l new executions after the opening of the s.
-W is a repository that stores the witness for each execution. The update W command extracts a witness from two transcripts of a slot (using the specialsound property). If the two transcripts are identical (i.e. the openings of the slot are the same), the simulator performs a brute-force search to extract a "fake" witness r i s.t. c i = f (r i ) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
-R is a repository that stores the transcripts of slots of unsolved executions. Transcripts are stored in R when the simulator gets stuck in a rewinding (cases 4 and 5 mentioned in the high-level description).
Analysis of the Simulator
To prove correctness of the simulator, we show that the output of the simulator is correctly distributed and its expected running-time is bounded. We first prove in Claim 1 that the simulator never outputs fail. Using Claim 1, we show in Proposition 1 that the output distribution of the simulator is correct. In Proposition 2, we show that the expected running time of the simulation is at most poly(m d r d ). Throughout this proof we assume without loss of generality the adversary verifier V * is deterministic (as it can always get its random coins as part of the auxiliary input).
Simulation never fails
Claim 1 For every x ∈ L, S V * (x, z) never outputs fail.
Furthermore, SOLVE outputs fail at recursive level ℓ only if it reaches Stage 2 of an unsolved execution that started at level ℓ (i.e. only in Step 3 of SOLVE). Note that at recursive level ℓ, at most (r − 1) d−ℓ executions are opened up. Hence, for all executions that start and complete r − 1 slots at level ℓ, there is some slot, inside which have fewer than (r − 1) d−(ℓ+1) executions opened; SOLVE must have rewound that slot "completely"-i.e. executed Step 5.d to obtain m good views without returning to a lower recursive level. Below, we show that whenever SOLVE rewinds a slot completely a witness is extracted and thus the proof of the claim follows.
Assume for contradiction that SOLVE fails to extract a witness after rewinding a particular slot. Let level ℓ and slot j of execution i be the first time this happens. This means at the end of Step 5.d, m good views are obtained and none of them contained a second transcript for slot j. Furthermore, in each such view, SOLVE got stuck only on unsolved executions that started at level ℓ (since otherwise SOLVE would have returned the view to the lower level). We now show that SOLVE can get stuck on the (at most m − 1) other executions that started on level ℓ at most once; this contradicts the fact that m good views were obtained.
For every execution i ′ that SOLVE gets stuck on, both the opening and the closing of the last slot occurs inside the rewinding of slot (i, j); otherwise, SOLVE would have rewound one of the r − 1 slots that occurred before the opening of slot (i, j) and by our assumption that l, i, j was the first "failed" slot, extracted a witness. Furthermore, the transcript of this slot enables SOLVE to never get stuck on execution i ′ again, since next time the last slot of execution i ′ closes a witness for that execution will be extracted.
Indistinguishability of the simulation Proposition 1
The ensembles {VIEW 2 [P (x, w) ↔ V * (x, z)]} x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1} * and {S V * (x, z)} x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1} * are identical.
Repeat forever: 
, then update W with v (using R) and proceed as follows.
′ be the prefix of the history h where the prover message for
* contains an accepting proof transcript for slot s ′ , extract witness for execution i ′ from h and h * and update W. iii. Otherwise, if the last message in h * is the closing message for the last slot of an execution that started in h initial return h * . iv. Otherwise, add h * to R ′ .
S V * (x, z):
) and output whatever SOLVE outputs, with the following exception. If in the execution of SOLVE 0, , , , ) , it queries V * more that 2 n times, proceed as follows: Let h denote the view reached in the "main-line" simulation (i.e., in the top-level of the recursion). Continue the simulation in a "straight-line" fashion from h by using a brute-force search to find a "fake" witness each time Stage 2 of an execution i is reached.
Fig. 2. Description of Simulator
Proof: Consider the following hybrid simulatorS V * that receives the real witness w to the statement x.S V * on input x,w, and z proceeds just like S V * in order to generate the prover messages in Stage 1, but proceeds as the honest prover using the witness w in order to generate messages in Stage 2 (instead of using the "fake" witness as S V * would have). Using the same proof as in Claim 1, we can show thatS V * (x, (w, z) ) never outputs fail. Furthermore, as the prover messages in Stage 1 are chosen uniformly andS V * behaves like an honest prover in Stage 2. Therefore, we get:
,z∈{0,1} * and {S V * (x, (w, z))} x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1} * are identical.
To show the proposition, it suffices to show that output distributions ofS V * and S V * are identical. This follows from the perfect-WI property of Stage 2 of the protocols, since the only difference between the simulatorsS V * and S V * is the choice of witness used. For completeness, we provide a proof below.
Claim 3 The ensemble {S
To prove the claim we will rely on the fact that the running time of the simulator is bounded. This holds since S stops executing SOLVE whenever it performs more than 2 n queries and continues the simulation in a straightline fashion, extracting "fake" witnesses using brute-force search. Assume, for contradiction, that the claim is false, i.e. there exists a deterministic verifier V * (we assume w.l.o.g that V * is deterministic, as its random-tape can be fixed) such that the ensembles are not identical.
We consider several hybrid simulators, S i for i = 0 to N , where N is an upper-bound on the running time of the simulator. S i receives the real witness w to the statement x and behaves exactly like S, with the exception that Stage 2 messages in the first i proofs are generated using the honest prover strategy (and the witness w). By construction, S 0 =S and S N = S. Since, by assumption, the outputs of S 1 and S N are not identically distributed, there must exist some j such that the output of S j and S j+1 are different. Furthermore, since S j proceeds exactly as S j+1 in the first j executions, and also the same in Stage 1 of the j + 1'th execution, there exists a partial view v-which defines an instance x ′ ∈ L∨L ′ for Stage 2 of the j +1'th execution-such that outputs of S j and S j+1 are not identical also conditioned on the event that S j and S j+1 feed V * the view v. Since the only only difference between the view of V * in S j and S j+1 is the choice of the witness used for the statement x ′ used in Stage 2 of the j + 1'the execution, we contradict the perfect-WI property of Stage 2.
Running-time of S
We consider the hybrid simulatorS Proposition 2 For all x ∈ L, z ∈ {0, 1} * , and all V * such that V * (x, z) opens up at most m executions,
Proof: Recall thatS V * (x, z) starts running SOLVE, but in the event that SOLVE uses more than 2 n queries to V * , it instead continues in a straight-line simulation using a brute-force search. By linearity of expectation, the expected running time of S is poly(E[# queries made to V * by SOLVE ])
In Claim 4 below, we show that expected time spent in straight-line simulation is negligible. In Claim 5 we show that the expected number of queries made by SOLV E to V * is at most m 2(d+1−ℓ) (2r) d+1−ℓ . The proof of the proposition follows.
Claim 4 The expected time spent byS
V * in straight-line simulation is negligible.
Proof: The straight-line simulation takes at most poly(2 n ) steps since it takes O(2 n ) steps to extract a "fake" witness. Recall that, SOLVE runs the brute-force search only if it picks the same challenge (β) twice. Since, SOLVE is cut-off after 2 n steps, it can pick at most 2 n challenges. Therefore, by the union bound, the probability that it obtains the same challenge twice is at most 2 n 2 n 2 . Thus, the expected time spent by S V * in straight-line simulation is at most 2 n 2 n 2 poly(2 n ), which is negligible.
Proof: We prove the claim by induction on ℓ. To simplify notation let α(ℓ) = m 2(d+1−ℓ) (2r) d+1−ℓ . When ℓ = d the claim follows since SOLVE does not perform any recursive calls and the number of queries made by SOLVE can be at most the total number of messages, which is mr.
Assume the claim is true for ℓ = ℓ ′ + 1. We show that it holds also for ℓ = ℓ ′ . Consider some fixed x ∈ L, h, s, W, R such that SOLVE
Towards this goal we introduce some additional notation. Given a viewĥ extending the view h,
denote the probability that the viewĥ occurs in the "main-line" execution of SOLVE
′ , h, s, W, R) (i.e., starting on level ℓ) and that slotŝ opens immediately afterĥ.
-Let Γŝ denote the set of views such that q
We bound the number of queries made by SOLVE
′ , h, s, W, R) as the sum of the queries SOLVE makes on level ℓ ′ , and the queries made by recursive calls. The number of queries made by SOLVE on level ℓ ′ is at most the total number of messages in an execution, i.e. mr. The number of queries made on recursive calls is computed by summing the queries made by recursive calls on over every slotŝ and taking expectation over every viewĥ (such that q
where Eŝ(ĥ) denotes the expected number of queries made by SOLVE from the viewĥ onŝ. There are two steps involved in computing Eŝ(ĥ). The first step involves finding the expected number of times SOLVE is run on a slot and the second step using the induction hypothesis computing a bound for Eŝ(ĥ).
Step 1: Given a viewĥ from where slotŝ opens, let p ℓ denote the probability that SOLVE rewinds slotŝ fromĥ, i.e. p ℓ is the probability that in the simulation fromĥ at level ℓ, V * completesŝ with an accepting proof while opening fewer than (r − 1)
′ new executions within the slotŝ. Let y ℓ denote the probability that when executing SOLVE at level ℓ fromĥ, V * either aborts or opens more than (r − 1)
′ new executions in slotŝ. We clearly have that p ℓ ≤ 1 − y ℓ (note that equality does not necessarily hold since SOLVE might also return to a lower recursive level). Furthermore, it holds that y ℓ = y ℓ+1 . This follows since SOLVE generates random Stage 1 messages, and uses the same (real) witness to generate Stage 2 messages, independent of the level of the recursion; additionally, since by Claim 4.1, SOLVE never halts outputting fail, we conclude that the view of V * in the "main-line" simulation by SOLVE on level l is identically distributed to its view on level l + 1.
Therefore, the expected number of times SOLVE recursively executesŝ at level ℓ + 1, before obtaining a good view, is at most Step 2: From the induction hypothesis, we know that the expected number of queries made by SOLVE at level ℓ ′ + 1 is at most α(ℓ ′ + 1). Therefore, if SOLVE is run u times on a slot, the expected total number of queries made by SOLVE is bounded by uα(ℓ ′ + 1). We conclude that Therefore, E[# queries by SOLVE
This completes the induction step and concludes the proof of Claim 2.
Concluding the proof of Theorem 1 (and Theorem 4)
Using r = 3, we get by Proposition 2 that the expected running-time of S is poly(m log2m ), and by Proposition 1 that its output is correctly distributed. This concludes the proof of Theorem 1. We also remark that the proof of Theorem 4 is directly obtained by instead relying on an n ǫ -rounds version of the protocol.
Proving the other theorems
Due to lack of space, we provide only proof ideas for the remaining theorems.
The complete proofs will be contained in the full version.
Proof idea of Theorem 2:
To prove the theorem, we rely on a slight variant of the ZK proof of [18, 20] (which is an instantiation of the protocol of [23] ); the protocol is described in Figure 3 . We assume the existence of honest-verifier ZK proofs that are secure w.r.t ω(PQT ). Such proofs exists if one-way functions that are secure w.r.t ω(PQT ) exists. Furthermore, we require constant round statistically hiding commitments that are computationally binding w.r.t PQT adversaries. Such commitment schemes can be constructed from collision resistant hash functions that are secure w.r.t PQT [7, 15] . The simulator and the proof of indistinguishability is essentially similar to Section 3.2. However, to bound the running-time of the simulator we require the Stage 2 of the protocol to satisfy the honest-verifier ZK property w.r.t. ω(PQT ). Proof idea of Theorem 3: The protocol is obtained by using a computational WI protocol w.r.t PQT instead of the perfect WI protocol in Stage 2 described in Section 3.1, which can be constructed based on the existence of OWF secure for PQT . The simulator and the analysis from Section 3.2 essentially works for this protocol too, except that to show indistinguishability we use the computational WI property of the protocol in Stage 2. Proof idea of Theorems 5 and 6: Our constructions are essentially identical to the protocols in [18, 20] . On a high level, the protocols show how to recast the ZK protocols for Graph Non-Isomorphism and Quadratic Non-Residuosity into the Feige-Shamir paradigm, after which we can rely on the same proof as in the previous section. Finally, Theorem 6 is directly obtained by relying on an r = n ǫ -rounds version of the protocol.
Protocol CompZKProof
Common Input: an instance x of a language L with witness relation RL. Auxiliary Input for Prover: a witness w, such that (x, w) ∈ RL(x). Stage 1: V uniformly chooses r = r1, r2, ..., rn ∈ {0, 1} n , s ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) . V → P: c = Com(r; s), where Com is a statistically hiding commitment, which has the property that the commiter must communicate at least m bits in order to commit to m strings. V → P: r first messages α1, . . . , αr for WI special-sound proofs of the statement. P ↔ V: P and V engage in n parallel executions of the GMW's (3-round) Graph 3-Coloring protocol, where V uses the strings r1, .., rn as its challenges: 1. P → V: n (random) first messages of the GM W proof system for the statement x. 2. V ← P: V decommits to r = r1, .., rn. 3. P → V: For i = 1..n, P computes the answer (i.e., the 3rd message of the GMW proof system) to the challenge ri and sends all the answers to V. 
Acknowledgements
We are very grateful to both Joe Kilian and Alon Rosen for insightful and helpful conversations.
